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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to estimate the effect of graduate education on the 
promotion of a U.S. Army field grade officer. In addition, this thesis investigates whether 
or not there are significant differences among career fields of the Officers Personnel 
Management System. To do so, a probit model and three correction models are built. The 
first correction model uses the Heckit method to correct for sample selection bias. The 
second model uses the instrumental variable regression method to correct for endogeneity 
of graduate education. The third model uses the double selection approach that combines 
the Heckit correction with two stage least squares to correct for both sample selection 
bias and endogeneity. 
The probit estimations indicate that the effect of graduate education for a 
representative officer increase the promotion probabilities by 0.148 and 0.132 for the 
grades of Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel, respectively. After correcting for sample 
selection bias, the effect of graduate education on the promotion to Lieutenant Colonel is 
reduced by 59.5 percent. After correction for endogeneity, this effect is increased by 70.9 
percent. Finally, this effect increases by 61.5 percent after correction for both sample 
selection bias and endogeneity. 
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A. BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
Military officers who served and fought for their countries in ancient or medieval 
times did not necessarily need to have an advanced education to be successful officers or 
winners of battles. However, the current war environment requires officers to not only be 
disciplined and physically fit for war, but also to be technically fit for the a war of 
technology and information. They should think critically and analytically to win the war. 
For that reason, nowadays many armed forces throughout the world educate their officers 
at civilian and military academic institutions so that they can receive graduate degrees 
such as Master’s degrees or Doctorate degrees. The United States Army also encourages 
officers to obtain their graduate education and supports them with fully-, or partially-
funded programs. Also, several officers have either earned or are willing to earn their 
graduate degree by self-funding. 
Since an investment in human capital increases an officer’s productivity 
according to human capital theory, officers who already have a graduate degree should be 
more productive compared to officers without a graduate degree. Unlike a civilian 
company, a person’s productivity can not be easily measured by an index such as wage 
differential. Gibbs points out characteristics of federal pay systems compared to those of 
private sector by noting that “federal pay systems are even more centralized, simple, and 
rigid in structure.”1 Also, he discusses in respect to rigidity and raises of DoD civilian 
compensation in General Schedule (GS) system that “Raises were awarded primarily for 
seniority so that pay for performance came about chiefly through promotions.”2 Since 
characteristics of military compensation system are similar to that of GS system in 
respect to rigidity, outcomes of promotion selection can be considered a good 
                                                 
1 Gibbs, Returns to Skills and Personnel Management, 213. 




measurement for individual productivity or performance. Wise also argued that 
promotion is proper measurement of performance if a certain hierarchical organization 
promotes higher performers faster than lower performers.3 Furthermore, the promotion of 
the officer is one of the most objective and reliable indexes for measuring an officer’s 
productivity in the military environment. 
Several studies have already been conducted to measure and isolate the effect of a 
graduate education on the promotion of officers. Causal effects, however, are prone to 
biases from self-selection or attrition and endogeneity of graduate education. Also, the 
effect of graduate education depends largely on career fields because field officers in U.S. 
Army are uniquely and separately managed by the Officers Personnel Management 
System (OPMS). 
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
The purpose of this study is to estimate unbiased effect of a graduate education on 
the promotion of an U.S. Army field grade officer. The effect of a graduate education can 
be under or over estimated because of sample selection bias or endogeneity. Since field 
grade officers are assigned, managed, and promoted by each career field of OPMS, 
estimation should be conducted for each of the four career fields of OPMS, separately. 
Following is the primary question of this study: 
1. What is the unbiased effect of a graduate education on the promotion of U.S. 
Army field grade officers? 
These are the secondary questions: 
1. Is the effect of a graduate education significantly different for each career field? 
2. Are there any other factors that interact with education that have a noteworthy 
effect on promotions? 
                                                 




C. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This study will investigate the effect of a graduate education on the promotion of 
U.S. Army field grade officers. More specifically, the study will focus on the effects of a 
graduate education on the promotion to Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel. Furthermore, 
the effects will be separately analyzed by the four career fields of the U.S. Army. These 
career fields are Operations, Information Operations, Institutional Support, and 
Operational Support.4 
Chapter II discusses general theories and several related prior studies so that a 
logical model for estimating the effect of education can be built. Also, the study looks at 
promotion, education, and OPMS of the U.S. Army. Chapter III presents a summary of 
the data and introduces dependent and independent variables. In addition, chapter III 
introduces methodologies and models used for the analysis. Then, chapter IV will present 
the results of several estimations. Finally, chapter V discusses conclusions and 
recommendations based upon the estimated results in Chapter VI. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The study is primarily quantitative and based upon data from U.S. Army Officer 
Active Duty Master file cohorts from 1981 through 2001. The data is provided by the 
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). The methodology used in this study consists 
of the following steps:  
1. Review of human capital theory, promotion policy, and OPMS of the U.S. 
Army.  
2. Review of previous studies in regards to the effect of a graduate education.  
3. Build a multivariate model based upon literature review.  
4. Conduct a multivariate analysis of the full sample using simple probit 
regression, as well as analysis of the four separate career fields. 
                                                 





5. Perform a correction procedure using the Heckit method to correct for 
sample selection bias due to attrition.  
6. Perform a correction procedure using instrumental variables to correct for 
endogeneity due to self-selection.  
7. Perform a correction procedure using a double selection model for biases 
because the initial models will likely be prone to both sample selection 
bias and endogeneity.  
8. Interpret and discuss estimation results, draw conclusions from results and 
offer recommendations for further study. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
A graduate education increases an individual’s productivity according to human 
capital theory. The U.S. Army also encourages officers to obtain graduate degrees. 
Increased productivity of the individual officer can be measured by promotion data in the 
military environment. Several estimations will be conducted to measure and isolate the 
unbiased effect of a graduate education on the promotion of U.S. Army field grade 






A. HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY 
The human capital theory developed by Becker (1975) posits that investments in 
human capital increase the productivity of individuals and therefore increase earnings.5 
Schultz points out that education and health programs, as well as internal migration, are 
examples of the investment in human capital.6 In his study, he focuses on spending 
special attention to education and training, especially a graduate education. 
Becker distinguishes between general training and specific training. General 
training is defined as training that “increases the marginal productivity of trainees by 
exactly the same amount in the firms providing the training as in other firms.”7 Education 
would be an example of general human capital, since it enhances the general skills and 
productivity of individuals in any firm. On the other hand, specific training only increases 
the productivity of the individual in the employing firm.8 Such training would involve 
skills that are too specific to carry over to other firms. Labor theory suggests that firms 
want to sponsor specific training, but not general training because the latter makes 
individuals more marketable and may increase attrition. In the civilian sector, employers 
will invest in training for employees only if the post-training marginal productivity 
exceeds increased wages and costs of training.9 In the public sectors, policy-makers need 
to investigate the policy of sponsoring advanced degrees and justify the cost based upon 
estimated rates of return and a conduct cost-benefit analysis.10  
                                                 
5 Becker, Human Capital, 231. 
6 Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 24-25. 
7 Becker, Human Capital, 13-14. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ehrenberg and Smith, Modern Labor Economics, 157. 




The U.S. Army also provides both general and specific training to its enlistees and 
officers. The U.S. Army officers are encouraged to obtain a graduate education. The 
Army funds graduate education programs in full or partially. These programs can 
increase the productivity and also can be used as an incentive for recruiting. Also, these 
programs are used as a tool for officer retention. However, they may increase 
employment opportunities outside and indirectly affect attrition. 
B. MILITARY AS AN INTERNAL LABOR MARKET 
Doeringer and Piore argue that “The internal labor market, governed by 
administrative rules, is to be distinguished from the external labor market of 
conventional economic theory where pricing, allocating, and training decisions are 
controlled directly by economic variables.”11 The military can also be viewed as an 
internal labor market from the perspective of labor economists. According to Asch and 
Warner, military as an internal labor market has unique characteristics such as a vertical 
hierarchy with a closed personnel system.12  
Bowman and Mehay adopt this approach to analyze the United States Navy 
(USN) and the effect of graduate education on careers.13 In this paper I investigate the 
same question focusing on the U.S. Army. The U.S. Army is organized as a vertical 
hierarchy made of ranks and its personnel system is also closed and well-defined by 
OPMS. It seldom allows lateral entry and involves the up-or-out system. Therefore, 
theses unique characteristics as an internal labor market should be considered in the 
process of analysis. 
                                                 
11 Doeringer and Piore, Internal Labor Markets and Manpower, 2. 
12 Asch and Warner, A Theory of Military Compensation and Personnel Policy, 37-38. 




C. OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM IN THE U.S. ARMY 
The U.S. Army defines its strategic goal of Officer Education System (OES) 
transformation as “to create an education and training system operationally relevant to the 
current force, but structured to support the Future Force by producing more capable, 
adaptable and confident leaders through continuous investment in personal growth and 
professional development throughout their careers.”14 Its strategic goal is well-aligned 
with human capital theory. A graduate education is also one of the categories of the U.S. 
Army OES.  
Officers are encouraged to get advanced degrees15 when they are available via the 
use of fully- or partially-funded programs.16 Normally to be selected for these programs, 
an officer should have finished his or her Captains Career Course (CCC) which is offered 
to officer who is promoted to Captain in the Army. The CCC should be completed before 
a Captain commands a company level unit. And they should have sufficient experience 
regarding branch or Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) to be selected for the 
programs.17 Under fully-funded programs, an officer will receive the costs of tuition, 
textbooks, and supplies for an 18-month study period.18 Under partially-funded programs, 
an officer should pay for all tuition, fees, and books except the full pay, allowance, and 
moves.19  
                                                 
14 Headquarters Department of Army, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career 
Management, 24. 
15 Master’s or Doctoral degree. 
16 Ibid., 30-31. 
17 Headquarters Department of Army, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career 
Management, 31. 
18 Ibid., 31. 




D. CAREER FIELD AND PROMOTION IN THE ARMY 
OPMS governs the career management of company and field grade officers in the 
U.S. Army. It is implemented by the U.S. Army Human Resource Command (HRC) 
Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD).20 Its missions are to 
1. Access and designate officers in the right numbers and with the right 
skills to satisfy current and projected Army requirements. 
2. Develop the professional skills and Warrior Ethos of officers through 
planned schooling and sequential, progressive assignments. 
3. Assign officers to meet Army requirements. 
4. Separate officers to meet individual and Army needs.21 
The subsystems of OPMS are strength management, career development, 
evaluation, and centralized selection. According to the Army Regulation 600-3, the key 
concept of OPMS is career field-based management.22 An officer who is promoted to 
major or O4 level is designated to one of four OPMS career fields by the Career Field 
Designation Board (CFDB). The four career fields consist of 39 branches and 19 
functional areas (FA). The field grade officer’s career patterns are managed mainly by a 
subsystem of OPMS. The U.S. Army revised OPMS career fields designated by the new 
OPMD design in 2005.  The new career branches are: Maneuver, Fires and Effects 
(MFE); Operations Support (OS); and Force Sustainment (FS).23 This study will focus 
and analyze data using the former OPMS design because the dataset used for analysis is 
comprised of U.S. Army Officer cohorts from 1981 to 1985. These cohorts are reviewed 
and selected under former OPMS design by the promotion selection board. 
                                                 
20 Headquarters Department of Army, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career 
Management, 10. 
21 Ibid., 10. 
22 Ibid., 14. 




U.S. Army officer selection for promotions from Major to Colonel is conducted 
by the Headquarters, Department of Army (HQDA) centralized board.24 For the selection, 
the centralized board considers the following factors: 
(1) Performance 
(2) Embodiment of Army values 
(3) Professional attributes and ethics 
(4) Integrity and character 
(5) Assignment history and professional development 
(6) Military bearing and physical fitness 
(7) Attitude, dedication, and service 
(8) Military and civilian education and training 
(9) Concern for soldiers and families25 
Table 1 shows promotion opportunities and time requirements to be promoted to 
next higher rank from First Lieutenant to Colonel. In this study I focus on the promotions 
to Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel. To be reviewed for the selection of promotion to 
Lieutenant Colonel, an officer should have served at least fifteen years in the Army and at 
least three years as a Major. For the promotion to Colonel, an officer should have served 
at least twenty one years in the Army and at least three years as a Lieutenant Colonel 
(refer to Table 1). 
Table 1.   Time in Service (TIS), Time in Grade (TIG), and Promotion opportunity 
Promote to: Timing (TIS) TIG Promotion Opportunity 
1LT/O2 18 months 18 months fully qualified 
CPT/O3 4 years plus 1 year 2 years best qualified (90%) 
MAJ/O4 10 years +/- 1 year 3 years best qualified (80%) 
LTC/O5 16 years +/- 1 year 3 years best qualified (70%) 
COL/O6 22 years +/- 1 year 3 years best qualified (50%) 
Source: From Headquarters Department of Army, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and 
Career Management (2005), table 5-2, p. 35. 
                                                 
24 Headquarters Department of Army, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career 
Management, 35-36. 




E. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES 
In this section, I review previous studies that have investigated the return to 
graduate education to build logical multivariate model and correction model. Particularly, 
attention will be given to selection bias issues.  Data sets used in this study are prone to 
two possible selection bias, sample selection bias and endogeneity. First, sample selection 
bias can be caused by incidental truncation of sample. Usually, the explanatory factors 
can always be observed for the estimation. However, the outcome variable which, in this 
study includes promotions, can not be observed when an officer leaves before being 
reviewed for promotion. If officers who left earlier are systematically different from 
officers who stayed, it can cause non-random sample selection issues and can result in 
biased estimators of the parameters. Thus, correction for sample selection bias is 
important to obtain unbiased effects of the graduate education variable. Second, the 
endogeneity problem can be caused by individuals selecting to enroll in graduate 
education. The officers who obtain a graduate degree may have higher cognitive ability, 
may have different preferences, and opportunity costs of attending graduate education 
programs.  In this sense, the graduate education indicator may be an endogenous variable. 
This problem can also result in biased estimators of the parameters. Therefore, another 
correction for endogeneity is necessary in order to obtain the unbiased effect of the 
graduate education variable. 
Previous studies have used data sets about employees in private sector, DoD 
civilians, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force officers and adopted various 
approaches to conduct multivariate analysis and correct some possible biases. Bowman 
and Mehay conducted a correction method using bivariate probit approach to correct 
endogeneity of a graduate education variable. Instrumental variables used for correction 
include sub-specialties, preference for graduate school, and a college performance 
variable (other than GPA) such as college math and science background.26 Branigan also 
employed correction methods for both sample selection and self-selection biases, 
                                                 




separately. He used bivariate probit model and a two-step Heckman method for the 
corrections.27 However, he did not attempt to correct for both biases simultaneously. 
Other studies reviewed in this section have not considered or discussed corrections for 
possible biases. 
Blackburn and Neumark use data from the National Longitudinal Survey Youth 
1979 (NLSY79) to examine the effect of omitted ability on schooling, and its effect on 
the wages of young workers.28 Authors implemented instrumental variable regression 
using scores from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) tests as 
proxies to correct for omitted ability bias in ordinary least-squares (OLS) wage 
equation.29 They concluded that there is no evidence of causal relationship between 
ability-schooling relationship and upward bias of returns to education, and they also 
found that returns to education had been increased only for workers who possess higher 
academic ability.30 In sum, their findings are generally consistent with human capital 
theory. Furthermore, they corrected omitted ability bias or endogeneity of education 
variable in wage equation. 
Gibbs used data on DoD civilians to examine returns to skills for civilian 
scientists and engineers of U.S. DoD laboratories.31 His data set included demographic, 
job, and compensation variables of DoD employees from fiscal year 1992 through 1996. 
He separately conducted analyses for three different DoD pay systems such as GS pay 
plan, Performance Management and Recognition System (PMRS), and Navy’s pay plan 
at the Naval Weapons Center at China Lake, California. He built logit salary models to 
conduct multivariate analysis of returns to education. His explanatory variables include 
Master’s degree, Doctorate degree, age, race, gender, veteran status, occupation, agency, 
                                                 
27 Branigan, The Effect of Graduate Education on the Retention and Promotion of Marine Corps 
Officers. 
28 Blackburn and Neumark, Omitted-Ability Bias and the Increase in the Return to Schooling. 
29 Ibid., 526. 
30 Ibid., 541. 




region, and a quadratic for years of service. He found that the returns to graduate degrees 
stayed “flat or declined” for DoD civilian scientists and engineers in the GS and China 
Lake pay plan, whereas, pattern of PMRS pay plan is inconclusive. 32  Finally, he 
concluded that returns to education for GS and China Lake pay plan did not rise over the 
period compared to private sectors firm.33 His findings are inconsistent with the theory of 
investments in human capital. He tried to make comparisons between private sector and 
public sector using various approaches such as analyses of recruitment and retention, and 
argued several possible explanations for his findings. One of the explanations is that there 
exist some variation in employees’ quality due to “inflation in titles and salary grades.”34 
Another explanation is that initial DoD compensation levels were higher than those of the 
private sector, and the private sector has closed the gap.35 However, he did not consider 
sample selection and endogeneity issues. This is important to address because these 
issues can result in biased estimators. For example, if the advanced degree holders, who 
work for the government are systematically different from advanced degree holders who 
work in the civilian workplace, then it can cause sample selection problem. 
Celik also conducted a multivariate study about the relationship between graduate 
education and the job performance of Department of Defense (DoD) civilian 
employees. 36  He focused on promotion speed and other selected job performance 
measures for all civilian DoD personnel employed between 1986 and 1999. He used two 
data sets including 213,482 observations from DMDC. Variables used for this study were 
sex, race, veteran status, agency, education, pay plan, supervisory status, and 
occupational category. 37  He estimated several models predicting salary, promotion, 
retention, and performance rating. Three different methodologies were used for the 
                                                 
32 Gibbs, Returns to Skills and Personnel Management, 204-205. 
33 Ibid., 212. 
34 Ibid., 213. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Celik, An Analysis of The Effect of Graduate Education on the Job Performance of Federal (DOD) 
Civilian Employees, 1. 




estimation of performance models. First, OLS was used to estimate the salary and 
performance rating models. Second, binary logit regressions were used to estimate 
promotion, retention, and performance rating models. Third, survival analysis using Cox 
Regression estimated the speed of promotion and the time to separation. The study found 
that employees with a Master’s or Doctorate degree gained more and received higher 
salary increases in the service. He also found that employees with a graduate degree were 
promoted slower since they were placed at the higher general schedule grades at entry, 
which limited subsequent opportunities for promotion. Higher educated employees were 
also more likely to leave federal service, but were more likely to be evaluated as a top 
performer and be selected as a supervisor.38 In general, his findings are consistent with 
human capital theory. The strength of this study is that the author tried to use various 
approaches to measure the effect of education on job performance. However, he did not 
address or correct for any other possible selection issues. For example, highly educated 
employees may have had higher ability and so higher performance could be attributed to 
ability not education. Also, since higher-ability individuals are more likely to leave, the 
promotion models may suffer from sample selection bias. 
Pearson conducted a study to examine the relationship between a graduate 
education and job performance of U.S. Air Force (USAF) line officers. 39  Pearson 
particularly focused on the retention and promotion of USAF officers to the levels of 
Captain and Major. Also, he tried to investigate whether a change in the USAF promotion 
policy, which masked the education information to promotion boards, had an effect on 
promotion outcomes. He used cohort data from the USAF Officer Active Duty Master 
File from fiscal years 1992 through 2006. The data set used for analysis included 28,505 
observations and 16 variables. For the estimation, Pearson used a logit regression model 
for both retention and promotion models because dependent variables for both models 
were binary. In addition, a difference-in-difference estimator was included in the 
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promotion logit model to determine whether the change of USAF promotion policy had 
an impact on the promotion outcomes. Explanatory variables consisted of demographics, 
professional, and education categories. Demographics categories included gender, race, 
age, marital status, and number of dependents. Professional categories consisted of 
commissioning source, current month in grade, prior enlisted experience, and Air Force 
Specialty Code (AFSC) career group. The education variable denoted the highest level of 
education such as a Baccalaureate or Master’s degree and above.40 For the two retention 
models (Captain and Major), the education variables were positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent and 10 percent significance level, respectively. For the 
promotion model, the education variable was positive and statistically significant at the 
10 percent significance level. The partial effect of graduate education on the promotion to 
Major was 0.020 and statistically significant at the 10 percent significance level. The 
difference-in-difference estimator was negative and not significant.  However, Pearson 
pointed out that the significance level was too low to make any conclusions about the 
change. From the results, he concluded that a graduate education had a significant 
positive effect on the retention of USAF Captains and Majors. Also, he concluded that a 
graduate education had a significant positive effect on promotion. 41  He found that 
Captains possessing an advanced degree had an increased likelihood of being promoted 
of 1.9 percentage points. In summary, Pearson’s findings were consistent with human 
capital theory as well. Although the results were not conclusive, the attempt for a natural 
experiment using a difference-in-difference estimator was one of the strengths of his 
study. Like Celik’s study, however, he did not consider the issue of possible attrition bias 
in his analysis. 
Branigan conducted a study investigating the impact of a graduate education in 
general and more specifically, obtaining a degree from the Naval Postgraduate School 
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(NPS).42 The retention of U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) officers and the joint probability 
of retention and promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel were measured as outcomes. 
He analyzed data from 1998 through 2001 Lieutenant Colonel promotion boards. Also, 
he used accession cohort data or a “Longitudinal TBS file” from December 1979 through 
September 1984. The data set was provided by the DMDC to the Center for Naval 
Analyses (CNA). In addition, the Registrar at the NPS provided a data set about USMC 
officers who graduated from NPS between 1983 and 2003. The accession cohort sample 
included 6,507 observations and the promotion sample included 1,627 observations. He 
grouped variables into several categories such as outcomes, cognitive traits, affective 
traits, performance traits, demographic traits and career traits. From the preliminary 
analysis of the descriptive statistics, he found that USMC officers with graduate degrees 
from any source were more likely to survive the Lieutenant Colonel promotion board and 
more likely to be promoted than the officers without graduate degrees. 43  For the 
multivariate analysis, he used simple probit regressions for both the retention and 
promotion models. Additionally, he tried to use several models to correct for selection 
bias. To correct for sample selection bias, he used a bivariate probit model and a two-step 
Heckman model, which included unemployment rate as an instrumental variable. He 
argued that the unemployment rate significantly affects a stay-or-leave decision based 
upon Wielsma’s study.44 To correct self-selection bias or endogeneity, he again used a 
bivariate probit model and included a General Classification Test (GCT) score as an 
instrumental variable.45  
Branigan found that the effects of a graduate education from any source, a 
graduate education from NPS, and a graduate education from sources other than NPS are 
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all positively related to both retention and promotion to Lieutenant Colonel based upon 
the results of simple probit models. Table 2 indicates marginal effects of a graduate 
education from both models. The results of the Heckman model which dealt with sample 
selection indicated that an upward bias existed in the graduate education coefficient. He 
also concluded that unobserved factors, which predict both a graduate education and 
promotion to Lieutenant Colonel, are negatively related based upon results of the 
bivariate models for self-selection for a graduate education and the Heckman models. 46  
Table 2.   Marginal Effects of Graduate Education on SURVIVE and SELECT 
 ANY MASTERS NPS NOT_NPS 
SURVIVE .120 .106 .125 
SELECT .150 .107 .167 
Source: From Branigan, The Effect of Graduate Education on the Retention and Promotion of Marine 
Corps Officers, table XXI, p. 84. 
 
One of the strengths of Branigan’s study is that he separately analyzed the effects 
of a graduate education by educational sources such as NPS and non-NPS. He raised and 
tried to correct biases regarding sample selection and self-selection. His finding regarding 
selection issues, however, were not conclusive. As he already mentioned in the limitation 
part of his study, more instrumental variables could be used for correction procedures. 
Also, none of the estimates produces simultaneously corrected estimates for sample 
selection and self-selection (endogeneity). 
For the U.S. Navy officers, Buterbaugh conducted a study to analyze the effects 
of a graduate education and undergraduate academic performance on the promotion of 
officers to the USN Commander and Captain. 47  He used two data sets of officer 
promotion history files for fiscal year 1981 through 1984. Additionally, he separately 
conducted analysis for pre-drawdown (1981-1989) and drawdown periods (1990-1994). 
He also conducted analyses for five warfare communities of the USN separately and for 
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the pooled sample. The five warfare communities were Surface Warfare Officers (SWO), 
Submarine Warfare Officers, Pilots, Naval Flight Officers (NFO’s), and a community of 
combined Fleet Support and Supply Officers. Data sets were provided by code Pers-10 in 
the office of the Chief of Naval Personnel. The Commander data set had 12,372 
observations and the Captain data set had 4,616 observations. He used OLS and logit 
regression for estimations. The dependent variable in his model was a binary variable 
named ‘PROMOTED’, which indicates whether the officer was promoted to the rank of 
Commander or Captain. Independent variables for his models were gender, race, graduate 
education, undergraduate grade point average (GPA), value of each undergraduate 
institution, whether the individual attended the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA), 
engineering field undergraduate degrees, prior enlisted status, and five occupational 
categories. Additionally, Chow tests were conducted to compare differences in 
determinants between the pre-drawdown period and drawdown period.   
Based on estimates from the pooled sample, the effect of a graduate education on 
the promotion to Commander was positive and statistically significant.48 From results of 
the five communities, he found that only the SWO community received significant 
positive effects from a graduate education and the undergraduate GPA and Support 
community received a significant effect from a graduate education. The effect of 
education on the promotion to Captain was not statistically significant. For a Captain 
promotion, only the Support community received a positive and significant effect from a 
graduate education. In general, the results of Buterbaugh’s study are consistent with 
human capital theory. His study was unique because he tried to analyze the effect of a 
graduate education from not only a pooled sample but also for the different communities 
separately. He found that not all the communities received positive and significant effects 
from a graduate education on the promotion. In his study, he had restricted a graduate 
education as fully-funded and had not distinguished the type of graduate education. 
Considerations about biases regarding sample selection and endogeneity were not made.   
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Another USN study was conducted by Bowman and Mehay. The purpose of their 
study was to examine the specific relationship between a graduate education and on-the-
job performance for professional employees in a single and large hierarchical 
organization such as the USN.49 The authors explained the military as an internal labor 
market that is characterized by a vertical hierarchy with a well-defined personnel system 
and they discussed that previous studies did not integrate the unique character such as 
structure, career paths, or the promotion process of certain firms or institutions.50 They 
concentrated on the promotion to Lieutenant Commander because it is a significant 
control point in an officer’s career and involves an up-or-out decision. The data set used 
for their analysis was the Navy’s promotion history file, which provided background 
information on all officers reviewed for promotion from 1985 through 1990. They 
divided the data set and conducted separate analyses for Line officers and Staff officers. 
The Line officer data set included 4,230 observations and the Staff officer data set 
included 2,353 observations. The specifications of their model were built based upon 
human capital theory. For the cognitive abilities, they included a technical undergraduate 
degree, and a graduate degree. They also controlled for the accession source, such as the 
USNA, Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), Officer Candidate School (OCS), or 
the enlisted ranks as variables. In addition to these variables, the authors also included 
age, gender, race, marital status, and family status as demographic factors. Four fiscal 
year dummy variables were also included to account for different opportunities of 
promotion for each cohort.51 
To analyze the unbiased effect of graduate education, they used simple probit 
regression models and assumed that graduate education variables were exogenous. Then, 
they added more controls to correct for the endogeneity bias, stemming from differences 
in motivation and career aspirations of USN officers getting a graduate degree. College 
GPA and early performance ratings were included as proxies for academic background 
                                                 
49 Bowman and Mehay, Graduate education and employee performance, 453. 
50 Ibid., 455. 




and early performance. As a second method, they used a bivariate probit model that used 
instrumental variables to correct for endogeneity of the graduate education variable. Sub-
specialties, preference for graduate school, and a college performance variable (other 
than GPA) were included as instrument variables. Additionally, they investigated the 
effects of funded and non-funded education on the promotion separately.  
Table 3 shows the effects of a graduate education from the results of the probit 
models and bivariate probit model estimation. From these results, the authors concluded 
that officers with any graduate degree were more likely to be promoted to Lieutenant 
Commander.52 The probabilities of promotion were 10 to 15 points higher. However, 
they also concluded that a sizeable portion of the relationship between a graduate 
education and promotion is due to unobserved attributes that lead some officers to select 
(or be selected for) graduate education programs and to be more promotable based upon 
selection corrected results. They indicated that the effect of a graduate education was 
reduced by between 40 and 50 percent after correcting for selection. 53  In general, 
Bowman and Mehay’s findings are consistent with human capital theory. An adequate 
sample size and sufficient theory-based specifications were used for their study. Their 
selection corrected models can be applicable for other services of the Armed Forces. 
However, some of the instrumental variables used for the selection correction model 
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Table 3.   Coefficient of any Master’s degree in Single Stage and Bivariate Probit Models 
 1. No controls for 
ability/performance 
































Source: From Bowman & Mehay, Graduate education and employee performance, table 4, p. 460. 
aStandard errors in parentheses. 
bMarginal effects in brackets. 
 
Finally, two studies conducted to investigate effect of graduate education for U.S. 
Army officers. Firstly, Kabalar conducted a multivariate study to examine the impact of a 
graduate education on promotion to U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel.54 In addition, the 
effects of basic demographic traits, prior enlisted status, and commissioning source on 
promotion were analyzed. The data set was the Active Duty Master File cohort data from 
fiscal years 1981 through 2001. For the study, only the first three cohort data were 
analyzed. Cohort 1981, 1982, and 1983 had 2,653, 2,274, and 1,907 observations, 
respectively. The pooled data set had a 44.8 percent promotion rate. He defined the 
binary dependent variable as promoted, which indicates outcomes of the Lieutenant 
Colonel promotion board. Independent variables were grouped into two categories. 
Demographic factors included gender, race, age, marital status, and number of 
dependents. Professional factors included education, commission source, DoD Primary 
Occupation Code (DPOG), and prior enlisted status. A logit regression model and 
classification tree model were used to investigate the relationship between a graduate 
education and promotion and to uncover data structure, respectively. Estimations were 
conducted for three different cohorts and a pooled sample. The odd ratios of the 
education variable for four estimations were positive and statistically significant. Table 4 
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indicates the odd ratios of the education variable. The classification tree model confirmed 
the positive impact of a graduate education on promotion.55 
Table 4.   The Odd Ratios of the Education Variable 
Year 95% Confidence Interval 
1981 (1.87 – 2.70) 
1982 (1.73 – 2.60) 
1983 (1.29 – 1.99) 
Pooled data (1.79 – 2.25) 
Source: From Kabalar, Multivariate Analysis of the Effect of Graduate Education on Promotion to Army 
Lieutenant Colonel, p. 35-36. 
 
Findings about U.S. Army officers are also consistent with human capital theory. 
As discussed in his limitations part, he could distinguish the type and source of a graduate 
education. Also, a compared analysis among career fields by OPMS was not conducted. 
Furthermore, the selection and endogeneity issues were not considered in this study. 
Secondly, Kahraman conducted another study using U.S. Army data to examine 
the relationship between an advanced education and the retention and promotion of Army 
officers.56 He compared promotion rates among four education categories: college degree 
only, Master’s degree, Doctorate degree, and professional degree. He focused on the 
promotion to Major. In addition, he investigated other retention behavior- or promotion-
related factors. The data set used for his study was provided by the DMDC. The data set 
was called the Active Duty Master File and contained information about the U.S. Army 
officer cohorts from 1981 through 2001. Status of promotion, retention and some other 
elements such as education, marital status were tracked until 2004. From the more than 
100,000 observations, he used 45,228 observations for the retention model and 12,092 
observations for the promotion model. For the promotion analysis, he excluded officers 
who had not served more than 8 years. Promotion rate to Major for cohorts from 1981 
through 1995 was 55.76%.   
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Kahraman, unlike the other previous studies, performed a survival analysis to 
capture not only the probability of promotion, but also the time of promotion. He 
implemented three methods of survival analysis. The three methods were survival pattern 
analysis, parametric regression models, and Cox (non-parametric) regression models. The 
dependent variable for the retention model was staying status of officer and for the 
promotion model the dependent variable was outcome of promotion to Major. Both 
dependent variables measure duration and he controlled for date censoring. His 
explanatory variables for both the retention and promotion models were the following: 
education level, gender, entry age, marital status, race-ethnicity, commission source, prior 
enlistment status, MOS, and commissioning year as an officer. His results showed that 
time to promotion to Major for an officer with a Master’s or Doctorate degree or a 
professional degree was 0.2 percent less or 2.4 percent less, respectively, compared to an 
officer without an advanced degree. Having a Master’s or Doctorate degree has a hazard 
of promotion that is 115.3 percent of that of an officer with a college degree. There was 
no significant effect found on the hazard of promotion for a professional degree. From 
these results, he concluded that having a graduate degree increased the probability of 
staying in the Army and also increased the probability of a promotion to Major.57 
Furthermore, an officer who has an advanced degree will stay longer than an officer who 
does not possess an advanced degree. In summary, Kahraman’s findings are generally 
consistent with human capital theory and previous studies. Since he distinguished 
categories of an advanced degree and used survival methods for the analysis, his study 
was unique among other previous studies. As he mentioned in his limitation section, 
however, he could not distinguish types and sources of advanced degree because of data 
limitations.  
                                                 





F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, several key concepts of the human capital theory are discussed 
such as the investment in human capital as well as general and specific training. The U.S. 
Army has unique characteristics as an internal labor market and also encourages officers 
to earn graduate degrees to increase their productivity. An officer can be selected for 
either fully- or partially-funded programs to obtain a graduate degree which is normally 
related with one’s MOS or FA as designated by the OPMS. Company and field grade 
officers in the Army are managed by the OPMS which has four career fields. In 2005, the 
OPMS was reorganized as a new OPMD design which now has three career fields. In this 
study, career fields are in accordance with the former OPMS design. 
In addition, several previous studies were reviewed in regards to the effect of a 
graduate education on the promotion of officers from four services of the U.S. Armed 
Forces as well as a DoD civilian. In general, findings of all the discussed studies were 
consistent with human capital theory, which particularly explained the concept that 
investment in human capital, namely in this study graduate education, increases the 
productivity of employees. 
Gibbs, Celik, Pearson, and Kabalar had not dealt with any potential biases in their 
data sets. Thus, their estimators were likely biased. On the contrary, Blackburn and 
Neumark, Branigan, and Bowman and Mehay used selection correction methods for the 
young workers in private sectors, USMC, and USN to obtain the pure effect of a graduate 
education. Since Bowman and Mehay used a promotion history file, they only dealt with 
bias regarding self-selection or endogeneity of a graduate education variable. Branigan 
dealt with both sample selection and self-selection biases. However, his findings were 
inconclusive and he did not attempt to correct for both biases simultaneously. Since the 
data set for this study possesses problem of both biases, a double selection model will be 
discussed and implemented to correct both biases, simultaneously. Buterbaugh conducted 
his analysis for five warfare communities as well as for a pooled sample of USN officers. 





OPMS. In this study, the analyses for four career fields of the U.S. Army will be 





III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. DATA SUMMARY AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The data set used for this study was the U.S. Army Officer Active Duty Master 
file. It was provided by the DMDC in Monterey, California. The initial data set contained 
information about cohorts from 1981 through 2001. Variables such as education, pay 
grade (rank), and marital status were tracked until 2004. Since the analysis considers the 
promotion to Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel, only cohorts entering from 1981 through 
1985, and 1981 through 1982 were used. This is because each promotion requires at least 
fifteen and twenty one years of service, respectively. Observations with miscoded or 
clearly erroneous information were excluded for the analysis. In addition officers who 
belong to special branches such as medical and judicial, which require officers to possess 
a graduate or professional degree at the time of commission, are excluded from the 
samples because their ability is systematically different that of most of other officers and 
they were already screened by a graduate education. The final Lieutenant Colonel sample 
has a total of 25,839 observations and the Colonel sample has a total of 1,785 
observations. Since the complete results of the promotion to Lieutenant Colonel can be 
available only for an officer who stayed at least seventeen years in the U.S. Army and 
was promoted to Major, the sample of the Lieutenant Colonel data set used for the simple 
probit regression model includes 6,168 observations. For the same reason, the sample of 
the Colonel data includes 1,134 observations. The rest of the observations, who did not 
stay enough time of service to be reviewed for promotions, are used for the correction 
model for sample selection bias. Levels of cognitive ability and experience for initial 
stage of most officers are very homogeneous because they all should possess a 




B. VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The choice of control variables for this study was based on the implications of 
human capital theory and previous studies by Kabalar,58 Kahraman,59 and Bowman and 
Mehay60 regarding investment in human capital. The names and descriptions of variables 
are shown in Table 5. The dependent variable of analysis is outcomes of promotion 
selection, called ‘Promoted’, for both data sets. Independent variables are separated into 
the following four categories: cognitive factors, accession source, demographic factors, 
and fiscal year dummy variables. The initial data set does not contain any ability proxies 
such as performance in college, types of Bachelor’s Degree, or any test scores except for 
status of education certificate and years of schooling.  
Table 5.   Names and Descriptions of Variables 
Variable name Variable description 
Dependent variables 
Promoted to O5 =1, if officer promoted to Lieutenant Colonel (O5) 
Promoted to O6 =1, if officer promoted to Colonel (O6) 
Independent variables 
(1) Cognitive factor 
Graduate education =1, if officer possess a graduate degree 
(2) Affective factors 
USMA =1, if source of commission is US Military Academy 
ROTC =1, if source of commission is Reserve Officers’ Training 
Corps 
OCS =1, if source of commission is Officer Candidate School 
Other sources of 
commission 
=1, if source of commission is other than USMA, ROTC, or 
OCS 
Prior Enlistment =1, if officer is prior enlisted / =0, otherwise 
Operations =1, if career field is Operations 
Institutional Support =1, if career field is Institutional Support 
Information Operations =1, if career field is Information Operations 
Operational Support =1, if career field is Operational Support 
Other career field =1, if career field is other than Operations, Institutional 
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Support, Information Operations, or Operational Support 
(3) Demographic factors 
Female =1, if gender is female / =0, Male 
White =1, if race is white 
Black =1, if race is black 
Other race =1, if race is other than white or black 
Married =1, if officer is married / =0, otherwise 
Married with children =1, if officer is married with children 
Divorced with children =1, if officer is divorced with children 
Entry age Continuous, Age at entry 
Number of dependents Continuous, Number of dependents at the time of entry 
(4) Fiscal Year dummies 
Fiscal year Dummy variables for fiscal year of commission 
 
In this analysis the graduate education variable is the variable of interest. The 
study does not distinguish between various forms of graduate education. Therefore, the 
graduate education indicator includes not only Master’s degrees but also professional and 
Doctorate degrees. Since there is no information about the source of the graduate 
education, namely fully- or partially-funded or self-payment, it is not distinguished.  
To capture institutional factors I also include the source of commission, status of 
prior enlistment, and career fields according to the OPMS. Source of commission 
includes the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), ROTC, OCS, and other sources of 
commission. The career field variables are included to control for differences of 
promotional opportunity among career fields. The career field variables are Operations, 
Institutional Support, Information Operations, Operational Support, and branches other 
than career fields. These variables are coded according to the DoD instruction 1312.1-1.61 
The demographic factors include gender, race, marital and family status, and entry age. 
Additionally, four fiscal year dummy variables are included to control for differences of 
promotional opportunity among cohorts. 
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Table 6.   Descriptive Statistics of the Lieutenant Colonel Sample by Education Status 
Officers with a 
graduate degree 
(n=3,932) 
Officers without a 
graduate degree 
(n=2,236) Variable 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Standardized 
difference 
Promotion rate  .845 .362 .682 .466 0.399 
Female .126 .331 .10 .304 0.071 
White .892 .310 .855 .353 0.116 
Black .085 .279 .124 .330 0.130 
Other race .023 .149 .021 .145 0.008 
USMA .268 .443 .136 .343 0.317 
ROTC .290 .454 .328 .470 0.082 
OCS .005 .073 .009 .094 0.044 
Other sources of 
commission 
.436 .496 .526 .499 0.180 
Married .796 .403 .769 .421 0.066 
Married with 
children 
.067 .250 .088 .283 0.078 
Divorced with 
children 
.171 .377 .188 .391 0.044 
Prior enlisted .143 .350 .164 .370 0.060 
Entry age 22.847 2.241 23.042 2.155 0.088 
Number of 
dependents  
.989 .649 .988 .695 0.000 
 
The descriptive statistics of the two samples are shown in Tables 6 and 7. 
Alongside sample means and standard deviations, I also present standardized differences 
that are obtained by dividing the sample mean difference by the sample standard 
deviation. The standardized difference is meant to highlight large differences in variable 
means between treatment and control groups. Differences exceeding a quarter of a 
standard deviation will be considered large both statistically, and practically. About 78.6 
percent of the officers in Lieutenant Colonel sample were promoted to Lieutenant 
Colonel. The descriptive statistics of the Lieutenant Colonel sample indicate that about 
63.7 percent of the officers who were commissioned from 1981 through 1985 possessed a 
graduate degree before other officers were promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. The 
promotion rate to Lieutenant Colonel of officers with a graduate degree is 84.5 percent. It 




degree. This difference exceeds a quarter of a standard deviation, and thus appears quite 
significant. The portion of officers who possessed a graduate degree and were 
commissioned by the USMA was about 13.2 percentage points higher than officers 
commissioned by the USMA without a graduate degree. Also, its standardized difference 
is bigger than 0.25 range. The portion of officers who possessed a graduate degree and 
were commissioned but not by the USMA, ROTC, and OCS was about 9 percentage 
points lower than officers without a graduate degree and commissioned but not by the 
USMA, ROTC, and OCS. The mean entry age of officers with a graduate degree 
was .195 year lower than that of officers without a graduate degree. Overall, officers who 
were promoted to Lieutenant Colonel appear to be better educated and more likely to 
have obtained graduate education. In addition, officers who obtain graduate degrees 
appear to be USMA graduates and slightly younger than officers without a graduate 
degree in Lieutenant Colonel sample. 
Table 7.   Descriptive Statistics of the Colonel Sample by Education Status 
Officers with a 
graduate degree 
(n=954) 
Officers without a 
graduate degree 
(n=180) Variable 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Standardized 
difference 
Promotion rate  0.518 0.500 0.406 0.492 0.224 
Female 0.094 0.292 0.061 0.240 0.117 
White 0.911 0.285 0.883 0.322 0.095 
Black 0.062 0.241 0.089 0.285 0.109 
Other race 0.027 0.163 0.028 0.165 0.003 
USMA 0.356 0.479 0.106 0.308 0.539 
ROTC 0.311 0.463 0.472 0.501 0.340 
OCS 0.002 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.050 
Other sources of 
commission 
0.330 0.471 0.422 0.495 0.194 
Married 0.808 0.394 0.744 0.437 0.159 
Married with 
children 
0.059 0.235 0.128 0.335 0.271 
Divorced with 
children 
0.192 0.394 0.256 0.437 0.159 
Prior enlisted 0.157 0.364 0.189 0.393 0.086 
Entry age 22.448 1.691 22.894 1.854 0.259 
Number of 
dependent  




About 50 percent of the officers in Colonel sample were promoted to Colonel. 
The descriptive statistics of the Colonel sample indicates that about 84.1 percent of 
officers who were commissioned between 1981 and 1982 possessed a graduate degree 
before the promotion to Colonel. The promotion rate of officers with a graduate degree 
was 51.8 percent and the promotion rate of officers without a graduate degree was 40.6 
percent. The percentage of the USMA graduates with a graduate degree was about 25 
percentage points higher than that of the USMA graduates without a graduate degree. 
This difference is more than half a standard deviation, and therefore quite large. The 
percentage of the ROTC with a graduate degree was about 16.1 percentage point lower 
than that of the ROTC without a graduate degree. This difference is more than a quarter 
of a standard deviation, suggesting that ROTC officers are significantly less likely to 
have a graduate degree. The portion of officers who possessed a graduate degree and are 
married with children was about 6.9 percentage points lower than officers without a 
graduate degree and married with children. The standardized difference is larger than a 
quarter of a standard deviation, suggesting that married officers with children are 
significantly less likely to obtain graduate degrees. The mean entry age of officers with a 
graduate degree was 0.446 year lower than that of officers without a graduate degree. Its 
standardized difference is bigger than 0.25 as well. Overall, officers who earn graduate 
degrees are more likely to be USMA graduates and younger than officers without a 
graduate degree in Colonel sample. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND MODELS 
1. Promotion Model for Both Samples 
Since the dependent variable of the two data sets is a binary variable, a probit 
regression was used for the analyses. Initially I assume that there are no sample selection 
issues and endogeneity of the graduate education variable. The four independent variable 
categories according to human capital theory and previous studies were included in the 
specifications. The model for both samples is the following, and represents a reduced-
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where variable D  is the graduate education variable, F  is a vector of career field 
variables, and X  is a vector of other factors such as affective factors yet not career field 
variables, demographic factors, and fiscal year dummies that are expected to affect the 
outcome of promotion selection. Variable s  is a dependent variable which takes the 
value of 1 if an individual officer stayed enough to be promoted to Lieutenant Colonel or 
Colonel, and was already promoted to Major or Lieutenant Colonel. Variable y  is a 
dependent variable which takes the value of 1 if an individual officer was promoted to 
Lieutenant Colonel in the Lieutenant Colonel sample. It also takes the value of 1 if the 
individual officer was promoted to Colonel in the Colonel sample. 
2. Promotion Model for Each Career Fields 
Simple probit regressions were used to investigate the effects of a graduate 
education by each career field under the assumption that there is no sample selection or 
endogeneity issue. The model built for the career field estimations is as follows: 
0 1 2( 1| 1, , ) ( )k ki i iP y s X D X D uβ β β= = = Φ + + +                              (2) 
where variable D  is an indicator for graduate education, X  is a vector of variables that 
are expected to affect promotions, including demographics, fiscal year dummies, as well 
as affective factors, not including career field variables. Since career management of the 
Army field grade officers are governed by career fields of OPMS, it is suspected that 
probabilities of promotions may vary by career fields. Therefore, the career field 
dummies are excluded because estimations will be separately conducted for each career 
field.  
3. Correction of Sample Selection Bias 
Both models may produce biased estimates since they are estimated on a 
truncated sample. Both explanatory variables and promotion outcomes can always be 




observed for officers who did not stay at least seventeen years to be promoted to 
Lieutenant Colonel, or twenty three years for the promotion to Colonel in the U.S. Army. 
If those who leave the military are systematically different from those who stay, then the 
sample used in estimations will produce results that are not representative of the entire 
population, and my result in biased estimators of the parameters.  
To correct for the sample selection bias, I adopt the Heckit method, developed by 
Heckman62, for both promotion outcomes. In this study, the equation of primary interest 
is the promotion equation (1) below. Now suppose that we can characterize the stay 
decision with equation (3):  
0 1 2 3( 1| 1, , , ) ( )k ki i i iP y s X F D X F D uβ β β β= = = Φ + + + +                 (1) 
0 1 2 3 3( 1| , , , ) ( )i ki i i iP s Z X F D Z X F D vγ γ γ γ γ= = Φ + + + + +                (3) 
where s  is an indicator for the decision to stay and takes the value of 1 if an individual 
officer chooses to stay in service for seventeen years or more, until the point of 
promotion to Lieutenant Colonel, or twenty three years or more for the promotion to 
Colonel. The variable Z  in (3) represents instrumental variables that explain the stay-
leave decision but do not affect promotion, and v  is the error term of the selection 
equation. 
Traditionally, the Heckit method would involve a two-step estimation. Equation 
(3) is estimated first for the entire data set (stayers and leavers) via probit. This estimation 
also yields an estimate for the inverse Mills’ ratio, $ iλ . The inverse Mills’ ratio is 
calculated using the formula: 
0 1 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
i ki i i
i
i ki i i
Z X F D
Z X F D
φ γ γ γ γ γλ γ γ γ γ γ
+ + + += Φ + + + +  
                                                 
62 James J. Heckman discussed the correction method of sample selection in his article; “The Common 
Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, Sample Selection, and Limited Dependent Variables and a 




This term can be thought of capturing all the information from the full sample that 
would lead to bias if equation (1) were estimated via OLS. Adding the inverse Mills 
ratio $ iλ  for the selected sample as an additional regressor to equation (1) will yield an 
unbiased estimate of the graduate education variable. However, a joint estimation of both 
equations via Maximum Likelihood (MLE) is more efficient (has a smaller variance). 
Since in this case both outcomes are binary, I perform an MLE estimation that takes into 
account the fact that both equations have limited dependent variables. (see Wooldridge, 
2002, for a detailed discussion). 
All the independent variables, which are part of the vector X  of the promotion 
equation, should be included in the selection equation. Furthermore, instrumental 
variables should be included in the selection equation as this is critical for the selection 
correction. A valid instrumental variable (IV) should not belong in the promotion 
outcome, but should explain selection into the sample (i.e. the stay-leave decision). For 
this analysis, I use “the national unemployment rate,” “whether the person is married to a 
military spouse”, and “member of the Special Forces” as instrumental variables. An 
explanation of the rationale behind these exclusion restrictions follows. 
The “unemployment rate” is already introduced and used as an instrumental 
variable to correct sample selection bias of the promotion equation by Branigan’s study. 
Unemployment rate can be an appropriate instrumental variable because it has no 
apparent relationship with promotion, but it may affect the decision of an individual 
officer’s stay-or-leave decision. Unemployment rate takes the value of the national 
unemployment rate for the fiscal year when officers finished their active duty service 
obligations (ADSOs). This variable would serve as a proxy for civilian employment 
opportunities, which may affect the stay-leave decision. According to Army Regulation 
350-100, ADSOs for the USMA, ROTC scholarship, nonscholarship ROTC, and OCS 
are five, four, three, and three years, respectively.63 
                                                 




“Being married to a military spouse” is not a criterion or a significant factor of the 
promotion selection. However, it is likely that an officer may not leave the U.S. Army if 
he or she has a spouse who serves in the Armed Forces. Thus, the indicator for being 
married to a military spouse may serve as an instrumental variable in the selection 
equation. 
Bowman and Mehay used occupational specialties as instrumental variables 
arguing that the cost of attending graduate school varies across occupational specialties, 
and that, after controlling for field, occupation specialty does not affect promotion.64 In 
the same vein I use an indicator for “Member of Special Forces” as an instrumental 
variable for the stay-leave decision. Special Forces officers are usually in charge of 
dangerous tasks compared to other occupations of the Army. In addition, officers in this 
occupation are more frequently separated from their families due to more intense and 
specific training and special missions. Furthermore, private security firms outside of 
military offer better compensation for special force officers. Therefore, it is suspected 
that Special Forces officers are more likely leave the Army. However, being in the 
Special Forces does not affect the probability of promotion because the Special Forces 
branch is one of occupations within Operations career field. Therefore, opportunities of 
promotion should be the same within the operations field, regardless of occupation. And 
all officers can be assigned to Special Forces at commission because it does not require 
possessing higher cognitive ability or certain specific training. Therefore, the variable 
“member of Special Forces” can be included as an instrumental variable into the selection 
equation. 
To determine the existence of sample selection bias and check the validity of 
instrumental variables, the correlation of the residuals in the two equations (ρ), will be 
estimated and a likelihood ratio test on whether ρ is statistically significant will be 
conducted. 
                                                 




4. Correction for Endogeneity 
Several previous researchers such as Bowman and Mehay and Branigan discussed 
that the graduate education variable can not be assumed as an exogenous variable, but it 
is an endogenous variable because the decision to obtain graduate education depends on 
individual preferences, the cognitive ability to be selected for a fully- or partially-funded 
program, the different possibility of getting a chance to attend career field programs, and 
the opportunity cost of attending a program. 
In this study, an instrumental variable regression method is used to correct the 
possible bias of the graduate education variable, which is likely caused by endogeneity. It 
is a two-stage least squares (2SLS) method using instrumental variables.65 The two-stage 
least squares model is specified below:  
0 1 2 3( 1| 1, , , ) k ki i i iP y s X F D X F D uβ β β β= = = + + + +                    (4) 
0 1 2 3i i ki i iD IVs X F eπ π π π= + + + +                                      (5) 
where variable D  is the graduate education variable, and variable IVs  is the set of three 
instrumental variables.  The vector X is other exogenous independent variables while e  
is an error term of Equation (5). The instrumental variables should not be correlated with 
the promotion outcome, but should be correlated with the graduate education variable. 
Four instrumental variables used for Equation (5) are “stationed outside of U.S.,” 
“permanent home is outside of the U.S.,” and “member of the Special Forces.” 
The first instrumental variable named “stationed outside of U.S.” takes a value of 
one if an officer was stationed outside of the U.S. at least once in his or her career. An 
officer who was stationed outside of the U.S. has less of a chance to attend and finish any 
type of graduate education program than an officer who only served in the U.S. The 
second instrumental variable named “permanent home is outside of the U.S.” takes a 
value of one if an officer’s permanent home is outside of  the U.S. at the time of 
                                                 




commission, which means that the officer’s native language is not likely English. It is 
suspected that an officer who does not speak or write English fluently will be less likely 
to obtain a graduate education because of the extra burden that education in a non-native 
language will present both during the application process and during graduate studies. 
His or her opportunity cost of attending a graduate program is larger than officers whose 
native language is English. The third instrumental variable named “member of Special 
Forces” takes a value of one if an officer’s branch is Special Forces. The officers in the 
Special Forces branch are more likely deployed for several combat tours outside of the 
U.S. They have lots of special training both in the U.S. and overseas. Many Special 
Forces officers tend to stay in the unit and acquire experience for their career 
management just like officers in the combat branches. Therefore, it is suspected that 
Special Forces officers are not likely to obtain a graduate education to enhance their 
productivity.   
5. Correction for Both Sample Selection Bias and Endogeneity 
None of previous studies, which are discussed in the Chapter II, had implemented 
a double-selection model, which corrects both sample selection bias and endogeneity 
simultaneously. Wooldridge proposes a method66  for correcting the sample selection 
problem when one variable is endogenous. The double selection model is specified as 
follows: 
0 1 2 3( 1| 1, , , ) k ki i i iP y s X F D X F D uβ β β β= = = + + + +                    (4) 
0 1 2 2 3i i ki i iD Z X F eπ π π π= + + + +                                      (5) 
1 0 1 1 2 3 3( 1| , , , ) ( )i ki i i iP s Z X F D Z X F D vγ γ γ γ γ= = Φ + + + + +                (3) 
                                                 
66 Wooldridge introduced and explained about method to correct the sample selection bias and 





where Z2 denotes a set of exogenous instrumental variables used for the graduate 
education variable and the vector 1Z  is a set of instrumental variables which are used for 
selection equation. The procedure for the corrections is as follows: 
(a) Estimate Equation (3) using all observations. Obtain the estimated inverse 
Mills ratios $ iλ .  
(b) Using the selected subsample (for which both outcomes of promotion 
selection and status of a graduate education are observed), estimate Equations (4) and (5), 
including the estimated inverse Mills ratios $ iλ  from Equation (5) as an additional 
instrumental variable and estimate the system by 2SLS.67  
The instrumental variables used for Equation (3) are “unemployment rate”, 
“military spouse”, and “member of Special Forces”. Also, the three instrumental 
variables used for the 2SLS instrumental variable regression are “stationed outside of 
U.S.”, “permanent home is at the outside of U.S.”, and “member of Special Forces”. A 
test for the null hypothesis of no selection issues can be found using the usual 2SLS t-
statistic for the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratios $ iλ .  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, a summary of the initial data set as well as the dependent and 
independent variables were introduced with descriptive statistics. Furthermore, five 
models were built and introduced for the estimations. The five models include the 
promotion model for both the Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel samples, the promotion 
model for each career field, the model for sample selection bias, the model for 
endogeneity, and the model for both sample selection bias and endogeneity. The Heckit 
method was used for the correction of sample selection bias and the instrumental variable 
                                                 
67 This procedure is an application of Wooldridge’s Procedure 17.2 from his book, Econometric 




regression method was used for correction of endogeneity. Finally, the double selection 





IV. RESULTS OF ESTIMATION 
A. PROMOTION TO LIEUTENANT COLONEL 
1. Pooled Sample 
As the first part of a multivariate analysis, a MLE estimation of a probit 
regression model for the Lieutenant Colonel sample was conducted and the results are 
displayed in Table 8. The sample used for estimation included the officers who were 
promoted to Major and served at least seventeen years to be reviewed for promotion to 
Lieutenant Colonel. The log likelihood value is -2970.275 and the pseudo R-squared is 
0.0725 for this estimation. 
Table 8.   Estimation Results of the Lieutenant Colonel Sample 
Dependent variable: Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel 
Independent variables 
 (1) Coefficient (2) Partial Effects 
Graduate education 0.507 0.148 
 (0.039)*** (0.012)*** 
Operations -0.248 -0.066 
 (0.060)*** (0.015)*** 
Institutional Support -0.043 -0.012 
 (0.107) (0.031) 
Information Operations 0.022 0.006 
 (0.124) (0.034) 
Operational Support -0.062 -0.018 
 (0.093) (0.027) 
Female 0.037 0.010 
 (0.061) (0.017) 
White 0.331 0.101 
 (0.118)*** (0.039)*** 
Black 0.221 0.057 
 (0.130)* (0.031)* 
USMA 0.110 0.030 
 (0.055)** (0.014)** 
ROTC 0.178 0.048 





OCS 0.339 0.080 
 (0.262) (0.052) 
Married 0.161 0.047 
 (0.109) (0.033) 
Married with children 0.011 0.003 
 (0.107) (0.030) 
Divorced with children 0.021 0.006 
 (0.119) (0.033) 
Prior Enlistment -0.049 -0.014 
 (0.055) (0.016) 
Entry Age -0.046 -0.013 
 (0.009)*** (0.003)*** 
Number of Dependents 0.032 0.009 
 (0.048) (0.013) 
Cohort82 0.206 0.054 
 (0.057)*** (0.014)*** 
Cohort83 0.287 0.072 
 (0.064)*** (0.014)*** 
Cohort84 0.466 0.116 
 (0.054)*** (0.012)*** 
Cohort85 0.603 0.144 
 (0.066)*** (0.013)*** 
Constant 0.879  
 (0.281)***  
Observations 6168 
Log likelihood -2970.275 
Pseudo R-squared .0725 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The graduate education variable, the variable of interest, is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The partial effect of the graduate education 
variable is calculated for an officer with average characteristics. According to estimates 
in column (2), a graduate degree increases the probability of promotion to Lieutenant 
Colonel by 0.148 and is statistically significant.  
Only one career field variable, namely Operations, is statistically significant and 
has a negative effect. The source of commission variables USMA and ROTC are 
statistically significant and have a positive effect. Among the demographic factors, only 
the entry age is statistically significant and has a negative effect on promotion. All four 




2. Career Fields by OPMS Design 
As a next step, estimations for four career fields were conducted and partial 
effects of the graduate education variables are displayed in Table 9. Complete results for 
all four career field estimations are displayed in Appendix A. For these estimations, 
officers who were promoted to Major and stayed until seventeen years of service are 
included in the sample. 
Table 9.   Effects of a Graduate Education on the Promotion to Lieutenant Colonel by 
Career Field (Partial Effects) 







0.144 0.070 0.117 0.156 0.216 Graduate 
education (0.014)*** (0.054) (0.057)** (0.063)** (0.035)***
Observations 4308 308 205 458 881 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The partial effects of the graduate education variables are generally significant 
and positive except for the Institutional Support career field, which is not significant. The 
category “Others”, which consists of some branches that are not included in any of the 
four major career fields, received the highest effect of a graduate education on the 
promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. The effect of graduate education is lowest for the 
Informational Operations career field, but it remains statistically significant. Partial 
effects of Operations and Operational Support career fields are 0.144 and 0.156, 
respectively, and these partial effects are similar to that of the pooled sample, 0.148. 
B. PROMOTION TO COLONEL 
1. Pooled Sample 
The same MLE probit estimation was conducted for the Colonel sample. The 
sample includes the officers who were promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and served at 




The results of the estimation including coefficients and partial effects are displayed in 
Table 10. The log likelihood value is -734.242 and pseudo R-squared is 0.0642. 
Table 10.   Estimation Results of the Colonel Sample 
Dependent variable: Promoted to Colonel 
Independent variables 
 (1) Coefficient (2) Partial Effects 
Graduate education 0.334 0.132 
 (0.109)*** (0.042)*** 
Operations 0.040 0.016 
 (0.115) (0.046) 
Institutional Support -0.287 -0.113 
 (0.187) (0.072) 
Information Operations -0.246 -0.097 
 (0.224) (0.087) 
Operational Support -0.256 -0.101 
 (0.169) (0.066) 
Female 0.230 0.091 
 (0.143) (0.056) 
White 0.169 0.067 
 (0.249) (0.098) 
Black 0.342 0.134 
 (0.290) (0.110) 
USMA 0.134 0.053 
 (0.105) (0.042) 
ROTC -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.097) (0.039) 
Married with children 0.748 0.278 
 (0.279)*** (0.089)*** 
Divorced with children -0.222 -0.088 
 (0.102)** (0.040)** 
Prior Enlistment -0.051 -0.020 
 (0.116) (0.046) 
Entry Age -0.005 -0.002 
 (0.026) (0.010) 
Number of Dependents -0.364 -0.145 
 (0.160)** (0.064)** 
Cohort82 -0.646 -0.253 
 (0.080)*** (0.030)*** 
Constant 0.312  






Observations 1132 1132 
Log likelihood -734.242 
Pseudo R-squared .0642 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The coefficient of the graduate education variable is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. The partial effect of the graduate education variable is 
0.132 and is about 0.016 percentage points lower that that of the Lieutenant Colonel 
sample. It can be interpreted that a probability of promotion to Colonel of an average 
officer with a graduate degree in the sample is 13.2 percentage points higher than an 
average officer without a graduate degree in the sample. 
The coefficients of many independent variables are not statistically significant. 
The partial effect of the “Married with children” variable is 0.278 and that of the 
“Divorced with children” variable is -0.088. The partial effect of the “Number of 
dependents” variable is -0.145. It can be interpreted that one more dependent than the 
average decreases an officer’s probability of promotion by 0.145. The fiscal year dummy 
variable, cohort 82, is negative and statistically significant. 
2. Career Fields by OPMS Design 
The MLE probit estimations for the four career fields using the Colonel sample 
were conducted and the partial effects around the mean of the graduate education variable 
are displayed in Table 11. Complete results of the four career field estimations using the 
Colonel sample can be found in Appendix A. 
Table 11.   Effects of the Graduate Education on the Promotion to Colonel by Career Field 
(Partial Effects) 







0.130 -0.209 0.026 0.050 0.290 Graduate 
education (0.048)*** (0.292) (0.289) (0.233) (0.119)**
Observations 765 71 42 96 156 
Standard errors in parentheses   





The partial effects of the graduate education variables for career fields such as 
Institutional Support, Information Operations, and Operational Support are not 
statistically significant due to small sample sizes. The partial effect for the Operation 
career field is 0.130 and is similar to that of the pooled sample, 0.132. The branches and 
functional areas other than the four career fields received the highest and significant 
effect of graduate education. It can be interpreted that the probability of promotion for an 
average officer with a graduate education is 0.29 higher than an officer without a 
graduate degree in the “Others” category. 
C. CORRECTION FOR SELECTION BIAS AND ENDOGENEITY FOR 
POOLED SAMPLED OF THE LIEUTENANT COLONEL SAMPLE 
The previous estimations using MLE probit regression were conducted based 
upon assumptions that the data sets do not have a selection problem and the graduate 
education variable is exogenous. Several previous studies, however, indicate that the 
education variable is endogenous and the data set used for this study will likely possess 
the problem of sample selection. Therefore, three models were estimated to correct 
sample selection bias and endogeneity both separately and simultaneously. The 
coefficients and partial effects of the graduate education variables from the estimation 
results are displayed in Table 12. The complete results of the three estimations are 
displayed in Appendix B. 
Table 12.   Coefficients and Partial Effects of the Graduate Education Variables from the 
Results of Correction Estimations 




























Partial effect change - ↓ 0.092 ↓ 0.088 ↑ 0.105 ↑ 0.091 
Percent change - ↓ 62.2% ↓ 59.5% ↑ 70.9% ↑ 61.5% 
Standard errors in parentheses, Partial effects in brackets   




1. Results of Sample Selection Correction Model 
The correction model of sample selection was estimated using the Heckit method 
with three instrumental variables such as “unemployment rate,” “military spouse,” and 
“member of Special Forces.” The whole observations of the Lieutenant Colonel sample 
are used for the first stage regression and a selected sample is used for second stage 
regression to correct sample selection bias. This estimation is conducted based upon 
assumptions that the selected sample possesses the problem of sample selection and the 
graduate education variable is exogenous. 
From the result of the two-step Heckit method, the partial effect of the graduate 
education variable is 0.056 and is significant at the 5 percent level. This partial effect is 
decreased by 9.2 percentage points of the probability of promotion from that of simple 
probit estimation and its effect is reduced by about 62.2 percent. It indicates that the 
selected sample has problems in regards to upward bias of the graduate education 
variable. Result of MLE estimation indicates that the chi-square statistics and the p-value 
of the LR-test of independent equations are 6.68 and 0.0098, respectively. The output of 
the LR-test indicates that there is sample selection problem in the selected sample data set. 
In the first stage regression, the instrumental variable “military spouse” is positive and 
statistically significant and “member of Special Forces” is negative and statistically 
significant. The “unemployment rate” variable, however, is not significant with its p-
value of 0.622. The partial effect of the graduate education variable is 0.060 and is 
significant at the 5 percent level. This partial effect is decreased by 8.8 percentage points 
of the probability of promotion from that of simple probit estimation and its effect is 
reduced by about 59.5 percent. It indicates that the selected sample has problems in 
regards to upward bias of the graduate education variable as well. 
2. Results of Endogeneity Correction Model 
The correction model for endogeneity was estimated using the instrumental 
variable regression method with four instrumental variables such as “stationed outside of 




This estimation was conducted based upon assumptions that there was no sample 
selection bias and the graduate education variable was endogenous. 
The F-statistics and p-value for the first stage regression are 30.30 and 0.000, 
respectively. It indicates that the three instrumental variables are significantly correlated 
with the endogenous variable, namely graduate education. The “stationed outside of  the 
U.S.” and “permanent home is outside of the U.S.” variables are negative as expected as 
is the assumption for instrumental variables and statistically significant at 1 percent and 
10 percent in the first stage regression, respectively.  The “member of Special Forces” 
variable is positive and significant at 1 percent. The sign of “member of Special Forces” 
variable has the opposite sign that expected. It could be that the officers in the Special 
Forces branch may be given more opportunities to attend a graduate school as a type of 
incentive for hardship of training or combat tours. Also, it could be that the officers more 
likely attend a graduate program to avoid family separation because of deployment. 
The partial R-squared from the first stage regression, representing the correlation 
between the education variable and the instrumental variables is 0.0122. This result 
indicates that the instrumental variables are strongly correlated with valuable measures. 
The null hypothesis of the test for over-identifying restrictions is that the instrumental 
variables are exogenous. The p-value of the output is 0.889 in this case. Therefore, the 
null hypothesis can not be rejected and it can be concluded that the instrumental variables 
are exogenous in this case. 
The coefficient of the graduate education variable for the instrumental variable 
regression is 0.253 and is significant at 1 percent level. This effect is increased by 10.5 
percentage points of the probability of promotion from partial effect of simple probit 
estimation and its effect is increased by about 70.9 percent. This indicates that there is 
downward bias due to endogeneity of the graduate education variable. 
3. Results of Double Selection Model 
The double selection model or correction model for both sample selection and 




with other instrumental variables. This estimation was conducted based upon 
assumptions that there was sample selection bias and the graduate education variable was 
endogenous. 
The instrumental variables for the simple probit model of the “STAY” equation 
are positive and significant except for “unemployment rate” as before. The F-statistics 
and p-value for the first stage regression are 329.1 and 0.000, respectively. This indicates 
that the four instrumental variables and an additional instrumental variable, which is the 
inverse Mills ratios from the simple probit model of the “STAY” equation, are 
significantly correlated with the endogenous variable graduate education. The partial R-
squared between the endogenous variable, education variable, and the instrumental 
variables is 0.108. This indicates that the instrumental variables are not weak. The p-
value of the test for over-identifying restrictions is 0.851 in this case. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis can not be rejected and it can be concluded that the instrumental variables are 
exogenous in this case as well. 
The coefficient of the graduate education variable for the double selection model 
is 0.239 and is significant at the 1 percent level. This effect is 0.091 higher than the 
estimate obtained via probit estimation and its effect is increased by about 61.5 percent.68 
It indicates that there is downward bias due to both a combination of sample selection 
bias and endogeneity of the graduate education variable. Thus, it can be interpreted that 
an average officer with a graduate degree has a probability of promotion to Lieutenant 
Colonel that is 30.4 percent higher than an average officer without a graduate degree.69 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the results of estimations for the simple probit models, correction 
of sample selection bias, correction of endogeneity, and double selection models were 
                                                 
68 The change of effect is calculated as: [Partial effect of baseline estimate (0.148) – coefficient of 
double selection estimate (0.239)] / Partial effect of baseline estimate (0.148) ×  100%. 





presented. The effects of the graduate education variable are positive and significant for 
both the Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel samples. After the correction for sample 
selection bias, the effect of the graduate education variable on the promotion to 
Lieutenant Colonel is reduced by 59.5 percent from that of simple probit model, 0.148. 
After the correction for endogeneity, this effect is increased by 70.9 percent. Finally, the 
output of the double selection model indicates that this effect is increased by 61.5 percent 




V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study investigates the effect of graduate education on the promotion of U.S. 
Army field grade officers and whether or not the effects of a graduate education are 
significantly different for each career field. Also, this thesis investigates if there are some 
other noteworthy influential factors in regards to promotion. The human capital theory 
and related policies of the U.S. Army were reviewed for detailed analysis. Furthermore, 
several previous studies were reviewed to acquire better methodologies and specifications 
of models for multivariate analysis. Based upon background study and literature review, a 
probit regression model and three correction models were built and methodologies for 
each model were introduced. The results of probit estimations were provided and three 
correction procedures were conducted to correct sample selection bias and endogeneity of 
the graduate education variable. It was found that the partial effects around the mean of a 
graduate education on the promotion to Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel are 0.148 and 
0.132, respectively, under the assumption that no sample selection bias and endogeneity 
was present. For the promotion to Lieutenant Colonel, the Information Operations career 
field received the lowest effect from a graduate education and the “Others” category, 
which is the set of branches not included in any of the four career fields, received the 
highest effect from a graduate education. For the promotion to Colonel, the “Others” 
category received a higher effect from a graduate education than the Operations career 
field. The sample selection corrected estimator of a graduate education indicated that 
there as upward bias due to sample selection bias. The effect of a graduate education on 
the promotion to Lieutenant Colonel was reduced by 59.5 percent after the correction 
procedure. The result of the instrumental variable regression for endogeneity indicated 
that there was downward bias due to endogeneity and this effect was increased by 70.9 
percent after the correction procedure. Finally, the results of the double selection model 




endogeneity. The effect of the graduate education variable was increased by 61.5 percent 
after the correction procedure. Therefore, an average officer with a graduate degree has a 
probability of promotion to Lieutenant Colonel 30.4 percent higher than an average 
officer without a graduate degree. 
From the results, one can conclude that there is a statistically significant and 
positive effect of graduate education on the promotion to both Lieutenant Colonel and 
Colonel. This is consistent with human capital theory and most previous studies. This 
magnitude of effect is larger than that of the USAF and USN when compared to previous 
studies. The effect of a graduate education in regards to the USMC, however, is similar to 
that of the U.S. Army. Additionally, the promotion to Colonel receives a smaller effect 
from a graduate education than promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. This might be because 
of the fact that officers who are about to be reviewed for the promotion to Colonel 
possess approximately same levels of cognitive abilities and experiences through the 
screening process of several promotion selection boards. It can be also concluded that 
there are significant differences among career fields regarding effects of a graduate 
education on the promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. The “white” race and sources of 
commission such as the USMA and ROTC have significant and positive effects on the 
promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. Entry age has a significant and negative effect on the 
promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. For the promotion to Colonel, some demographic 
factors such as divorced with children and number of dependents have significant and 
negative effects. The variable “married with children” has a significant and positive 
effect on the promotion to Colonel. 
It was found from the results of three correction models that there were some 
upward or downward biases of the graduate education variable due to sample selection 
and endogeneity. It can be concluded that there is combined downward bias of the 
graduate education variable for the U.S. Army data set due to sample selection and 
endogeneity. Although the officers in the selected sample, who are more likely 
promotable to Lieutenant Colonel, have stayed until promotion selection and earned a 




having a graduate degree so that it induces some best-performing officers, who will more 
likely be promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, not to choose to earn a graduate degree. In 
other words, some best-performing officers are more focused on their career management 
in the field and less focused on the enhancement of potential productivity through the 
graduate education program in the U.S. Army. This fact might cause the downward bias 
of the graduate education variable. In this study, it was found that the effect of the 
graduate education variable was increased by 61.5 percent after the correction for both 
sample selection and endogeneity.  
Overall, results of this study are consistent with investments in human capital of 
human capital theory. Downward bias in respect to self-selection issue of graduate 
education is consistent with USMC study of Branigan. But it is inconsistent with studies 
of Bowman and Mehay, and Blackburn and Neumark. There can be possible explanation 
that characteristic of officers in USMC or U.S. Army are different that of USN, USAF, or 
employees in private sectors. Officers in USMC or U.S. Army are needed to highly focus 
on performance of practical managerial tasks and excellent leadership in operation fields. 
If they want to be promoted general officer level, they should have more experience in 
operation fields rather than to attend and finish a graduate education. Officers in USN, 
USAF and employees in private sectors, however, generally focus more on performance 
of technical and intellectual tasks due to their missions and task environments. To 
enhance their ability and be informed for recent change of technologies and knowledge, 
they are often needed to attend an advanced education. Therefore, opportunity costs for 
attending a graduate education of U.S. Army or USMC officers are larger than that of 
USN, USAF, and employees in private sector. This kind of differences of characteristics 
may make inconsistency of selection corrected estimators. 
The effects of graduate education from military are generally bigger than that of 
private sectors. One of possible reasons is that many individuals in private sectors were 
already screened by a graduate education in respect to signaling at entries of certain firms. 
Nowadays, many candidates for employees in private sectors earn graduate degrees 




implementing signaling effect of a graduate education and most hired employees with a 
graduate education are assigned to position so that they can perform and receive 
compensation which is equivalent for their education levels. Therefore, it is less likely to 
observe increased productivities of employees who possess a graduate degree in most 
case of private sectors. In the military, however, almost every officer enters military 
without a graduate degree except for officers in medical or judicial corps. Thus, there is 
no role of a graduate education as a signaling tool at the entry. Since officers obtain their 
graduate degree within service time, it is possible to observe increased productivities of 
individual officers in the military circumstance. Therefore, I argue that the effects of 
graduate education for military officers are generally bigger than that of employees in 
private sector.          
B. LIMITATIONS 
There exist some limitations for this study. The results of the three correction 
models for the Colonel sample and for each of the career fields are inconclusive due to 
the small sample size, and therefore the results are not displayed or discussed in this 
study. Some other cognitive factors such as grade point average associated with one's 
undergraduate degree or type of undergraduate and graduate degree are not available for 
this study. Also, significant affective factors such as evaluation data are not available for 
this study. The U.S. Army has changed its OPMD design in 2005 and corresponding data 
set is not available for this analysis. Lastly, this study did not distinguish the source and 
type of an officer's graduate education. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Further studies could utilize the findings of this and previous studies for cost-
effective or cost-benefit analyses regarding a graduate education program. Additionally, 
the unbiased effect of a graduate education on the promotion to Colonel and each career 
field with sufficient sample size could be investigated. Also, the findings of this thesis 
could be helpful for a detailed cost-effective analysis by distinguishing the source and 




affective factors regarding promotion, a robust and more reliable multivariate analysis 
could be conducted as well. Further study can also focus on the new implemented OPMD 
design of the U.S. Army. When sufficient data sets and documents are available, a 
detailed analysis regarding three newly established career fields such as MFE, OS, and 









APPENDIX A. ESTIMATION RESULTS BY CAREER FIELD 
Table 13.   Estimation Results of Lieutenant Colonel Sample by Career Field (Partial Effects) 







0.144 0.070 0.117 0.156 0.216 Graduate 
education (0.014)*** (0.054) (0.057)** (0.063)** (0.035)***
Female 0.002 -0.009 0.028 -0.004 0.041 
 (0.022) (0.085) (0.093) (0.065) (0.026) 
White 0.132 0.164 0.090 -0.015 -0.052 
 (0.049)*** (0.133) (0.216) (0.115) (0.063) 
Black 0.071 0.030 0.028 0.048 -0.072 
 (0.039)* (0.089) (0.154) (0.101) (0.115) 
USMA 0.037 0.051 0.056 0.029 0.011 
 (0.018)** (0.057) (0.053) (0.040) (0.034) 
ROTC 0.037 0.106 0.077 0.028 0.082 
 (0.015)** (0.045)** (0.052) (0.037) (0.025)***
OCS 0.035     
 (0.076)     
Married 0.028 0.131 0.082 0.148 0.071 
 (0.042) (0.155) (0.160) (0.102) (0.070) 
-0.002 0.019 0.121 -0.038 0.027 Married with 
children (0.039) (0.183) (0.043)*** (0.103) (0.052) 
-0.025 0.098 0.017 0.077 0.057 Divorced with 
children (0.046) (0.076) (0.129) (0.055) (0.053) 
-0.040 0.027 0.042 0.028 0.071 Prior 
Enlistment (0.021)* (0.061) (0.065) (0.046) (0.026)***
Entry Age -0.014 0.003 0.006 -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.003)*** (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.004)***
0.022 -0.016 -0.150 0.022 -0.010 Number of 
Dependents (0.019) (0.056) (0.072)** (0.039) (0.022) 
Cohort82 0.061 0.092 0.025 -0.164 0.008 
 (0.017)*** (0.042)** (0.074) (0.101) (0.042) 
Cohort83 0.103 0.082 -0.105 -0.276 -0.003 
 (0.017)*** (0.044)* (0.110) (0.113)** (0.045) 
Cohort84 0.146 0.091 0.125 -0.149 0.014 
 (0.014)*** (0.043)** (0.048)*** (0.080)* (0.036) 
Cohort85 0.196 0.061 0.043 -0.075 -0.008 







Observations 4308 308 205 458 881 
Log likelihood -2220.901 -118.340 -75.366 -166.370 -330.637 
Pseudo 
R-squared 
.0721 .0761 .1346 .0743 .1115 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 14.   Estimation Results of Colonel Sample by Career Field (Partial Effects) 







0.130 -0.209 0.026 0.050 0.290 Graduate 
education (0.048)*** (0.292) (0.289) (0.233) (0.119)** 
Female 0.135 0.346 -0.260 -0.080 -0.017 
 (0.068)** (0.318) (0.470) (0.231) (0.122) 
White -0.001 0.709 -0.862 -0.744 0.688 
 (0.117) (0.227)*** (0.065)*** (0.096)*** (0.054)***
Black 0.060 0.868 -0.731 -0.599 0.740 
 (0.139) (0.158)*** (0.084)*** (0.130)*** (0.054)***
USMA 0.061 0.322 -0.127 -0.163 0.164 
 (0.051) (0.218) (0.224) (0.147) (0.122) 
ROTC -0.013 0.477 -0.262 -0.052 0.045 
 (0.046) (0.217)** (0.232) (0.156) (0.104) 
Married 0.105 -0.105  0.168  
 (0.048)** (0.233)  (0.155)  
0.258   0.046 0.413 Married with 
children (0.102)**   (0.267) (0.214)* 
  -0.518  -0.056 Divorced with 
children   (0.214)**  (0.103) 
0.022 -0.310 0.097 0.295 -0.138 Prior 
Enlistment (0.057) (0.145)** (0.352) (0.171)* (0.108) 
Entry Age -0.018 0.086 0.111 0.018 0.014 
 (0.013) (0.066) (0.056)** (0.060) (0.024) 
-0.138  0.509  -0.159 Number of 
Dependents (0.072)*  (0.465)  (0.161) 
Cohort82 -0.221 -0.294 -0.346 -0.492 -0.246 
 (0.037)*** (0.124)** (0.195)* (0.098)*** (0.083)***
Observations 765 71 42 96 156 
Log likelihood -499.547 -37.096 -21.907 -53.337 -94.458 
Pseudo 
R-squared 
.0568 .2329 .2425 .1893 .1265 
Standard errors in parentheses      





APPENDIX B. ESTIMATION RESULTS OF CORRECTION 
MODELS FOR LIEUTENANT COLONEL SAMPLE 
Table 15.   Estimation Results of Correction Models 



















0.250 [0.061] 1.546 0.242 0.209 Graduate 
education (0.104)** (0.022)*** (0.088)*** (0.097)** 
Operations -0.202 -0.553 -0.045 -0.071 
 (0.062)*** (0.047)*** (0.023)** (0.017)*** 
-0.186 1.328 -0.008 0.026 Institutional 
Support (0.116) (0.128)*** (0.025) (0.047) 
-0.156 1.435 0.013 0.048 Information 
Operations (0.137) (0.146)*** (0.030) (0.055) 
-0.189 1.369 -0.029 0.013 Operational 
Support (0.101)* (0.124)*** (0.022) (0.041) 
Female 0.065 -0.372 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.061) (0.033)*** (0.018) (0.019) 
White 0.309 0.124 0.097 0.102 
 (0.116)*** (0.066)* (0.040)** (0.039)*** 
Black 0.182 0.189 0.076 0.080 
 (0.129) (0.072)*** (0.043)* (0.044)* 
USMA 0.105 0.011 0.016 0.031 
 (0.054)* (0.044) (0.021) (0.015)** 
ROTC 0.155 0.112 0.050 0.057 
 (0.046)*** (0.026)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** 
OCS 0.319 0.078 0.096 0.095 
 (0.257) (0.119) (0.055)* (0.054)* 
Married 0.117 0.268 0.030 0.043 
 (0.109) (0.053)*** (0.030) (0.031) 
0.033 -0.081 0.010 0.001 Married with 
children (0.106) (0.061) (0.031) (0.031) 
0.040 -0.088 -0.006 -0.011 Divorced with 
children (0.117) (0.058) (0.033) (0.034) 
Prior Enlistment -0.024 -0.181 -0.020 -0.026 
 (0.055) (0.030)*** (0.016) (0.018) 




 (0.009)*** (0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
0.032 0.015 0.006 0.007 Number of 
Dependents (0.048) (0.027) (0.013) (0.013) 
Cohort82 0.219 -0.117 0.061 0.060 
 (0.057)*** (0.038)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** 
Cohort83 0.308 -0.128 0.088 0.083 
 (0.064)*** (0.051)** (0.019)*** (0.020)*** 
Cohort84 0.480 -0.133 0.135 0.128 
 (0.053)*** (0.069)* (0.015)*** (0.016)*** 
Cohort85 0.618 -0.118 0.166 0.160 
 (0.065)*** (0.087) (0.017)*** (0.018)*** 
 -0.624   Member of 
Special Forces  (0.060)***   
   0.067 Inverse Mills 
Ratio    (0.070) 
 0.022   Unemployment 
Rate  (0.045)   
Military Spouse  0.637   
  (0.034)***   
Constant 1.104 -0.409 0.710 0.704 
 (0.287)*** (0.352) (0.105)*** (0.111)*** 
Observations 25839 25839 6168 6168 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Partial effect in brackets       




APPENDIX C. LIST OF ACRONYM 
ADSOs Active Duty Service Obligations 
AFSC Air Force Specialty Code 
ASVAB Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery 
CCC Captains Career Course 
CFDB Career Field Designation Board 
CNA Center for Naval Analyses 
DMDC Defense Manpower Data Center 
DoD Department of Defense 
DPOG DoD Primary Occupation Code 
FA Functional Areas 
FS Force Sustainment 
GCT General Classification Test 
GPA Grade Point Average 
HQDA Headquarters, Department of Army 
HRC Human Resource Command 
IV Instrumental Variable 
LR Test Likelihood Ratio Test 
MFE Maneuver, Fires and Effects 
MLE Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
MOS Military Occupational Specialty 
NFO’s Naval Flight Officers 
NLSY79 National Longitudinal Survey Youth 1979 
OCS Officer Candidate School 
OES Officer Education System 
OLS Ordinary Least-Squares 
OPMD Officer Personnel Management Directorate 
OPMS Officers Personnel Management System 
OS Operations Support 
PMRS Performance Management and Recognition System 
ROTC Reserve Officers’ Training Corps 
SWO Surface Warfare Officers 
TIG Time in Grade 
TIS Time in Service 
USNA U.S. Naval Academy 
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